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Structural Breaks in Volatility:
The Case of Chinese Stock Returns
Abstract
This paper tests for periodic breaks in the unconditional variance of stock return data on two
Chinese stock return market indexes. Using the modified ICSS algorithm, we observe three
breaks in Shanghai Stock Exchange composite index and Shenzhen Stock Exchange composite
index series. We document the policy changes related to the Chinese stock market and explain
that the Chinese stock market is largely influenced by government policy.
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1. Introduction
China’s stock market has developed significantly over the past 20 years. The two major
stock markets, Shanghai and Shenzhen securities exchanges, opened on December 19, 1990 and
July 3, 1991, respectively. The official public issue of the first stock issuance can be traced back
to 1984, in which Feile Acoustics sold 10,000 shares at RMB50 per share. From a house
consisting of only five listed companies, China’s domestic stock market has become the second
largest equity market in the world, valued at $3.21 trillion as of July 15, 2011. The investigation
of the Chinese stock market has been a topic of great interest in recent years. Not only because of
China’s growing importance in the world economy, but also because the stock market with
“Chinese characteristics” shows particular patterns that may not be explained by the former
experiences of developed equity markets.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the volatility of the two major stock return
indexes in Shanghai and Shenzhen. The ability to accurately model and forecast asset returns
volatility has important implications in a number of areas of finance, including risk management,
portfolio management, and the pricing of derivative securities. Thus, it is not surprising that a
large empirical literature has been developed concerning what is the most appropriate model in
which to obtain reliable volatility forecasts (for a recent survey of the literature see Poon and
Granger (2003, 2005)). Due predominantly to the prevalence of ‘volatility clustering’ in asset
returns, the generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic (GARCH) model of Engle
(1982) and Bollerslev (1986) has become the major framework through which to model and
forecast stock market volatility. An assumption typically made by researchers is the existence of
a stable GARCH process, or a constant unconditional variance, when forecasting volatility.
However, the assumption of a constant unconditional variance has been called into question.
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Periodic breaks in the unconditional variance of asset returns have important
implications for volatility modeling and forecasting using GARCH models.1

Mikosch and

Stărică (2004b) demonstrate temporal variation in the unconditional variance using estimates
from a rolling GARCH model. The cumulative evidence from this extant literature demonstrates
that the presence of either occasional structural breaks or a slowly changing unconditional
variance will result in the apparent existence of long memory when analyzed using models that
assume a constant unconditional mean volatility level, such as the GARCH model. The fitted
GARCH processes used for forecasting asset return volatility are typically very persistent and a
failure to account for structural breaks in the unconditional variance of asset returns may lead to
the fitting of GARCH models that are too persistent, which can have adverse effects on volatility
forecasts. Furthermore, fitted GARCH models that neglect structural breaks can fail to track
changes in the unconditional variance and thus produce forecasts that systematically under- or
overestimate volatility on average for long periods of time. In summary, structural breaks have
potentially important implications for forecasting the volatility of asset returns. 2 The study of
structural breaks in the variance of Chinese stock returns has deeper implications. It is believed
that government policies and regulations play an important role in the operation of China’s stock
market, as the market has become more mature and more integral to international markets since
China jointed WTO.

1

Earlier research by Diebold (1986), Hendry (1986), and Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990), as well as more recent
research by Lobato and Savin (1998), Diebold and Inoue (2001), Granger and Hyung (2004), Mikosch and Stărică
(2004a) and Hillebrand (2005) all show that failing to account for structural breaks in the unconditional volatility of
asset returns can lead to sizable upward biases in the degree of persistence in estimated GARCH models. Also see
Kim and Kon (1999) and Granger and Hyung (2004). Intuitively, over-estimating the degree of persistence in
volatility by failing to account for structural breaks is related to the argument made by Perron (1989) in the context
of unit root testing: failure to account for periodic breaks in the mean (or linear trend) of a stationary series can lead
one to over-estimate the degree of persistence in the series and fail to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root (Type
II error).
2
In the context of exchange rate return volatility forecasting, West and Cho (1995) speculate that the forecasting
performance of GARCH models could be improved by allowing for structural breaks in the unconditional variance.

3

In this paper we employ a modified version of the Inclan and Tiao (1994) iterative
cumulative sum of squares (ICSS) algorithm to test for structural breaks in the volatility of the
Chinese stock market using two major indices. Malik and Hassan (2004) examine shifts in
volatility using the ICSS algorithm using weekly-Wednesday closing returns over the period
January 1, 1992 to August 6, 2003, focusing on five major Dow Jones stock indexes (financial,
industrial, consumer, health and technology sectors). They find that volatility is less persistent if
regime shifts are accounted for than if they are not. Aggarwal, Inclan, and Leal (1999) also use
the ICSS procedure to detect volatility shifts in stock returns in emerging markets and conclude
that volatility persistence is overstated if these endogenously determined break points in
volatility are not accounted for.3
This paper employs weekly data from 1990 to 2011 and finds that both the Shanghai and
the Shenzhen stock market returns have undergone three structural breaks since inception. The
critical dates for the Shanghai exchange are 10/20/1996, 12/08/2006, and 03/20/2009, and the
critical dates for the Shenzhen exchange are 05/16/1997, 11/10/2006, and 03/20/2009. There are
a few studies examining structural breaks in the volatility of Chinese stock returns. Chen and
Huang (2002) apply the ICSS algorithm to analyze the Shenzhen index over the period 1993 to
2001. The ICSS algorithm is challenged by Sanso et al (2004) as it is only valid under the
assumption that the error term is independent and identically distributed. When the error term
follows the dependent process of a GARCH model, the ICSS algorithm is biased. Yang (2009)
employs a modified ICSS algorithm to detect structural breaks in China and find three breaks
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Malik (2003) investigates five major exchange rates from January 1990 to September 2000 and finds lower
persistence in volatility if the standard GARCH model is augmented with the determined breakpoints in volatility.
Rapach and Strauss (2008) investigate the empirical importance of structural breaks for GARCH models of
exchange rate volatility employing both in-sample and out-of-sample tests. They find significant evidence of
structural breaks in the unconditional variance in seven of eight US dollar exchange rate return series over the period
1980-2005 implying an unstable GARCH process for these exchange rate series. They also find that the parameters
of a GARCH(1,1) model of these series vary significantly over subsamples defined by the structural breaks.
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(03/20/2000, 11/29/2006, 01/17/2008) for the Shanghai A market and one break (01/17/2008) in
the Shenzhen A market, using data over the period 01/03/1997 to 05/07/2008. Liu et al. (2011),
using marginal likelihoods to identify structural breaks in a stock market volatility model,
identifies five regimes using data over the period 12/19/1990 to 10/31/2009. Li and Zhang
(2006), employing the CU2SUM test on data between 1994 and 2004, find two breaks, while
Chen and Huang (2002) find four breaks. Wang and Zhao (2010), using the modified ICSS
algorithm on the data of the China Securities Index 300 covering the period between 01/04/2002
and 06/30/2008, report three structural breaks (on 06/24/2002, 11/29/2006, 01/18/2008). It is
clear that the literature has not found any agreement on the break dates in volatility.
Our paper differs from the above studies in that it i) adopts a much longer time span of
data relative to earlier studies, using the modified ICSS algorithm and most importantly, ii)
presents an historical review of the Chinese stock market, and iii) links the three structural breaks
that we find to government policies and thus illustrate policy or events corresponding to
identified structural breaks. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the
Chinese Stock Market since 1984. Section 3 describes our econometric methodology. Section 4
describes the data and discusses our results. We also undertake additional analysis and provide a
discussion regarding the implications of the results. Section 5 concludes.

2. Review of China’s Stock Market
The stock market in China from 1986 to the present has experienced tremendous change
as well as a large amount of rent-seeking behavior. The first stock share of China’s stock market,
Feile Acoustics, was issued in December 1984 in Shanghai. In 1986, the Shenzhen government
was the first to make regulations standardizing the process by which enterprises could be
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recognized as shareholding companies. Shenzhen Development Bank (SDB) became the first
company that publicly offered their shares in 1987. And, when SDB announced their dividend
plan (RMB 7 per share) for the 1988 financial year, it became a turning point in China’s
experiment with stock markets. The stock price skyrocketed from RMB40 to RMB120 in half a
year. The investors learned that stock can appreciate “and with this, they acquired the speculative
habits” (Walter and Howie; 2006, pg 6). The early stage of experimentation with corporate
forms and securities was entirely unregulated. The Over-the-Counter (OTC) markets at that time
were inconvenient and black markets flourished. On December 19, 1990, the Shanghai Stock
Exchange (SHSE) was opened to provide formal central registration of stocks and competitive
pricing systems and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange’s opening (SZSE) followed several months
later. The State Council put an announcement of restrictions on the shareholding experiment and
limited the opportunity to the state sectors. The concern that the property of the state would be
sold out or privatized brought out a system that defined shares in terms of the relationship
between the shareholders and the state and then made any state-related shares non-tradable.
These special regulations ensure that the government maintains control over the listed
companies. Three different share categories were created. Any State-Owned Enterprise (SOE)
converting into a shareholding company would have to divide up its share capital into three
sections. About one-third of shares can be publicly issued, owned by either public retail investors
or employees of a company who have invested their own wealth in the company. This part of the
shares can be freely traded and known as public shares. About one-third of the company’s equity
is made up of state shares. These shares are owned by State Council, authorized representatives
of the state’s investment in the company. Legal person shares make up the final third of the
company’s equity. They are allocated to SOEs, institutions, or authorized social groups with
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legal person status. Both state shares and legal person shares cannot be traded on the stock
market. This equity structure guaranteed that the state maintained their large controlling interest.
“As a result, the market has evolved into a dysfunctional halfway house, where neither public
officials nor private shareholders enjoy effective control over most listed firms, and few in
management have incentives to help their firms create value” (Green 2003 pg. 118).
The first major regulation of the stock market occurred in late 1990. The early stage of
development of China’s stock market is filled with stories of price manipulations. However,
young capital markets are often poorly regulated because officials may lack of experience and
expertise. Scandals like 8.10 riot and 327 treasury-bond futures forced the government to make
policies and make regulations more efficient.4 The Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission
(CSRC) gained their authority through the establishment of regulatory institutions in 1996, the
year that trading volume at the SZSE dramatically increased from RMB 382.4 million in 1995 to
RMB 4.9 billion. A mass of bank deposits were illegally lent to securities companies and
invested in the stock market. These transactions were implicitly approved by two stock
exchanges. At the end of the year, the government responded forcefully with the announcement
of “Twelve Gold Shields” policies aimed at regulating the markets.5 Later in December, an
editorial article titled “On correctly understanding the current stock market” published in the
People’s Daily spoke of share prices as “abnormal and irrational” and warned against the highly
speculative nature of the current market. Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges reinstituted a 10%
daily trading range for all listed stocks. Since 1998, much improvement has taken place in the
quality of regulation. However, more progress needs be made. With the exception of very serious
The “8.10” Shenzhen stock riot breaks out in reaction to a badly managed initial public offering on August 10,
1992. 327 T-bond futures scandal refers to the event in which Wanguo, one of the biggest securities agencies,
attempted to manipulate market prices by selling contracts exceeding its limitation. China has banned bond futures
ever since.
5
Fei Yue, a well-known Chinese military leader in the Song Dynasty, received “Twelve Gold Shields” from the
emperor calling him back to the capital.
4
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cases that are publicly censured, no one has been imprisoned due to price manipulation or inside
trading.
Starting in 2001, the government realized that the poor equity structure of listed
companies were the cause of the market’s serious problems and tried to readdress the problems
by reducing non-tradable shares. These attempts led to a collapse of the tradable market over the
next four years that resulted in a loss of more than 50% of the value of market capitalization. The
discussion was stopped and the plan was cancelled at that time. The topic was not discussed
again until 2005, the year that CSRC introduced a new policy, which they hoped to be the final
solution to the problem of segmented markets. Under this new policy, the controlling
shareholders of listed companies were meant to reach an agreement with A-share shareholders
over the amount of compensation to be paid in return for making non-tradable shares tradable.
As CSRC said, “the non-tradable shares reform is to optimize the governance structure of
company, solidify the mutual interest ground of all shareholders, promote the listed companies to
use various innovative financial tools to improve the capital operation efficiency, optimize the
capital structure, bring in better investment returns.” (Li and Zhang 2007, pg. 3) It is clear that
the reform was aimed at improving corporate governance and operation efficiency. Equity
markets entered a bull market in 2006 just following the point where most companies reached an
agreement for share structure resolution. From 2009, most stated owned non-tradable shares
became tradable in the markets. Unfortunately, the bull market had already ended by that time.
The answer to the question of whether non-tradable shares reform improved market efficiency is
still not clear.
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3. Econometric Methodology6
3.1. Modified Iterative Cumulative Sum of Squares Algorithm
It has been shown that structural breaks in conditional variance have important
implication for the estimation of and predictions from GARCH models of stock returns. Not
accounting for structural breaks in the parameters of a GARCH model may induce upward biases
in measures of persistence.

Neglecting structural breaks in parameters will also lead to

inaccurate forecasts of stock return volatility. The current paper investigates the existence of
multiple structural breaks in GARCH (1,1) models of Chinese stock returns using weekly data
over the period 1991 to 2011. This provides us with structural breaks in the unconditional
variance of Chinese stock returns. We employ a modified version of the Inclan and Tiao (1994)
iterated cumulative sum of squares algorithm that allows for dependent processes.
Following Rapach and Strauss (2008) we let Rt = 100 log(Pt / Pt-1) denote the continuous
return for a stock index from time t - 1 to t, where Pt is the value of the index at time t, and let rt
= Rt - μ, where μ is the constant (unconditional) mean of Rt7. Assume that we observe rt for t = 1,
... , T. Inclan and Tiao (1994) develop a cumulative sum of squares statistic that can be used to
test the null hypothesis that the unconditional variance of rt is constant for k = 1, ... , T against
the alternative hypothesis of a break in the unconditional variance at some point in the sample.
The statistic is given by:

IT = sup (T / 2) Dk
0.5

(1)

k

where Dk = (Ck/CT) - (k/T) and Ck = 

k
rt 2 for k=1,….,T. The IT statistic applies when rt ~
t =1

6

This section draws from Rapach, Strauss and Wohar (2008).
Qu and Perron (2007) employ a multivariate regression based procedure in which they allow for a change in mean
as well as allowing for a change in the disturbance variance/covariance matrix. This is a different strand of break
point literature from that conducted in this paper. Here we are interested in a GARCH model that allows for multiple
structural breaks in unconditional variance.
7

9

iid N(0,  2r ).

When the null hypothesis is rejected, the value of k that maximizes |(T/2)0.5Dk |

serves as the estimate of the break date.
One possible drawback of relying on the IT statistic is that it is designed for iid processes;
however, many return processes appear to be characterized by temporal dependencies, such as
the autocorrelation in conditional volatility captured by GARCH models. A number of studies,
including Andreou and Ghysels (2002), de Pooter and van Dijk (2004), and Sanso et al. (2004),
show that the original IT statistic can be substantially oversized for dependent processes,
including GARCH processes.8 In order to allow for rt to follow a variety of dependent processes
(including GARCH processes) under the null hypothesis, a non-parametric adjustment can be
applied to the original IT statistic; see, for example, Kokoszka and Leipus (1999), Lee and Park
(2001), and Sanso et al. (2004). In order to allow for dependence processes under the null
hypothesis, the ICSS procedure can instead be based on the AIT statistic which employs a nonparametric adjustment based on the utilizes a Bartlett Kernel, and which we designate as the
‘modified ICSS algorithm’. Finite sample critical values for AIT can be generated by simulation
methods. Inclan and Tiao (1994) show that a modified statistic that allows for non-iid data series

AIT = sup T 0.5Gk where Gk = ˆ−0.5 Ck − (K / T )CT .
is given as

k

3.2. GARCH Model
The canonical GARCH(1,1) model is well known and only briefly outlined here. The
basic model is given by:

8

rt = ht0.5 t ,

(3)

ht =  + rt 2−1 +  ht −1 ,

(4)

Size distortions increase with the sample size.
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where

 t is i.i.d. with mean zero and unit variance. In order to ensure that the conditional

variance, ht, is positive, we require   0 and  ,   0 . The GARCH(1,1) process specified in
equations (3) and (4) is stationary if  +   1 . If  +  = 1 , then one has the integrated
GARCH(1,1) or IGARCH(1,1) model of Engle and Bollerslev (1986).

For a stationary

GARCH(1,1) process, the unconditional variance for et is given by  / (1 −  −  ) . Note that
when  = 0 in equation (4),  is unidentified (and set to zero), so that ht =  and et is
characterized by conditional homoskedasticity. The GARCH(1,1) model is often estimated
using quasi-maximum likelihood estimation (QMLE), where the likelihood function
corresponding to et ~ N (0,1) is used and the restrictions   0 and  ,   0 are imposed, and
we follow this in the present paper. QMLE parameter estimates can be shown to be consistent
and asymptotically normal under certain conditions; see, for example, Ling and McAleer (2003)
and Jensen and Rahbek (2004).

4. Data and Breakpoint Results
Our weekly data are obtained from Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) center, Shanghai
Stock Exchange (SSE) composite index and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) center, Shenzhen
Stock Exchange (SZSE) component index. These two indices are well integrated and developed
since the beginning of China’s equity markets. The data for the SSE composite index range from
12/28/1990 to 4/18/2011 including 1,058 observations. The data for the SZSE component index
range from 04/13/1991 to 4/18/2011 including 1,042 observations.
Descriptive statistics for these two markets are reported in Table 1 and Table 3. These
statistics demonstrate the usual properties of weekly financial returns data, namely a small mean
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dominated by a large standard deviation and evidence of non-normality with (typically negative)
skewness and excess kurtosis, which reveal data as characterized by a large number of large
shocks (with more negative than positive large shocks). The mean of weekly return is relatively
small compared to the standard deviation. For the SSE index, the skewness and kurtosis are both
large, partially because the market shows extreme changes in certain days. For example, on
05/21/1992, the index skyrocketed from 616.99 to 1266.49. On the other hand, the skewness and
kurtosis of the SZSE index are relatively small, though still large enough to reveal that a mass of
large shocks has affected the market mean. These tables also report significant evidence of
ARCH effects through the usual LM test.
The results of the breakpoint tests described in Section 3 are reported in Table 2 and
Table 4. These tables also report the GARCH(1,1) model estimates and thus present the degree
of volatility persistence and the level of unconditional volatility. The breakpoint information and
the level of volatility is also reported in Figures 1. In analyzing these results there are two broad
characteristics we want to focus upon. First, what is the existence and timing of breaks as well as
the level of mean volatility in each identified regime? Second, what are the implications of these
breaks for the estimated GARCH models and the degree of persistence in particular? Taking the
first issue, both Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets have had three structural breaks in their
history. The critical dates for Shanghai exchange are 10/20/1996, 12/08/2006, and 03/20/2009,
and the critical dates for Shenzhen exchange are 05/16/1997, 11/10/2006, and 03/20/2009. These
results differ from previous studies, suggesting that using a longer span of data as we do will
change the date of the volatility breaks. For the Shanghai stock index (Table 2, Panel B) when
breaks in volatility are accounted for, GARCH affects disappear in subsamples 2, 3 and 4.
Similarly, for the Shenzhen Stock Index (Table 4, Panel B) when volatility breaks are accounted
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for GARCH effects disappear for subsamples, 1, 3 and 4. These are the expected results.
With regard to the timing and impact of the volatility breaks, this can perhaps be most
easily seen in Figures 1. Taking a global perspective of the results we can observe that there are
four periods of market-wide volatility. First, there is a general decline in volatility around the end
of 1996 with the establishment of the regulatory institutions. Before 1996, the regulatory power
was not clearly defined among the Public Bank of China (PBOC) and the CSRC, or even local
governments. The publication of the 1996 regulations delegated full authority and regulatory
control to the CSRC over the markets. The improved regulations limited manipulation and inside
trading which were prevalent at that time. Price volatility has been reduced since then. Second,
there is an increase in volatility associated with both indices during 2006 – 2009. Most of SOEs
reached their agreement on the compensation the end of 2006. After that, the Chinese stock
markets then entered a bull market. The SSE Composite Index reached the historical high of
6,124 on October 16, 2007. The SZSE Component Index reached the historical high of 19,600 on
October 10, 2007. However, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) as of October, 2007 was 6.5%, the
highest in 11 years. Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
started to control inflation and this led much volatility of the stock market. For instance, in 2007,
central back increased the reserved rate 10 times over the year and raised interest rate 6 times. In
addition, there are many positive shocks to the market since the gradual introduction of the
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) since the end of 2002 and official market
openness in August 2007 that the foreign investors are allowed to trade in Chinese stock markets.
This results large amount of capital inflows from the foreign investors (Su, Ma and Wohar;
2012). These positive and negative shocks made large volatility over this period. Third, there is
a decline in volatility for both indices at the end of 2008. The coming bear market was worsened
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by the subprime mortgage crisis. On December 31, 2008, the SSE Composite Index closed at
1,820 and the SZSE Component Index closed at 6,485. Both indices declined more than 60%.
Both the Shanghai and Shenzhen market had their third structural break on March 20, 2009. In
this last period, which lasted about two and half years, the SSE Composite Index increased 8.4%
from 2281 to 2473, and the SZSE Component Index increased 22.1% from 8647 to 10561. The
trading of investors had been in a downturn and investor confidence was hit by the economic
slump. The co-movement of the market index and market capitalization has a break point at
2009 and after that market capitalization expanded much more than the growth of the market
index. The first two structural breaks are consistent with some earlier studies and consistent with
our expectation. No other research has identified the third break yet as this paper uses a longer
time span data set.
Overall, the results that the Chinese stock market are largely influenced by government
policy and are consistent with the findings of Chen et. al. (2008) and Huang et. al (2008) who
examine the effect of government policy on the stock market. Chen et. al. (2008) investigates
the effectiveness of two regulatory policy changes on the volatility dynamics of the Chinese Aand B-share markets. Their findings indicate that the government policy does have significant
effect on the market. Huang et. al (2008) test for structural change on 234 constitute stocks of
the Shanghai Shenzhen 300 Index (HS300). They examine two event windows for each stock
along the reform structure designed by the CSRC and report results that indicate that reforms
drive stock prices up in more than two-thirds of the cases.
In practice, our results suggest that market returns volatility is subject to structural breaks
whereby the mean (or unconditional) level of volatility is subject to upward and downward
shifts. These results suggest that in estimating and forecasting volatility one needs to take into
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account the structural breaks that cause both the mean level of volatility to change and the degree
of volatility persistence to change. Ignoring both of these characteristics would inevitably lead to
poor forecasts.

5. Summary and Conclusion
This paper employs weekly data from 1990 to 2011 to examine the structural breaks in
the unconditional variance of stock return data on two Chinese stock return market indexes.
Using the modified ICSS algorithm, we observe three breaks in both the Shanghai Stock
Exchange composite index and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange composite index series. We find
that both Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets have had three structural breaks since inception.
The critical dates for the Shanghai exchange are 10/20/1996, 12/08/2006, and 03/20/2009, and
the critical dates for the Shenzhen exchange are 05/16/1997, 11/10/2006, and 03/20/2009. Our
documentation of the policy changes related to the Chinese stock market indicates that the
Chinese stock market is largely influenced by government policy. Knowing this has important
implications to Chinese investors.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics – Shanghai Stock Index Returns.
Mean
Standard deviation
Skewness
Excess kurtosis
Minimum
Maximum
ARCH Lagrange multiplier (q = 2)

0.054 (0.014)
4.521 (0.184)
0.112 (0.285)
3.932 (0.974)
-22.630
27.516
51.70 [0.000]

ARCH Lagrange multiplier (q = 10)

136.58 [0.000]

Note: Returns are defined as 100 times the log-difference of weekly index level. Heteroskedastic and
autocorrelation consistent standard errors for the mean, standard deviation, skewness, and excess kurtosis are given
in parentheses. ARCH Lagrange multiplier statistics correspond to a test of the null hypothesis of no ARCH effects
from lag orders 1 through q. P-values are given in brackets; 0.000 indicates less than 0.0005.
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̂
̂
̂

Table 2. Quasi maximum likelihood estimation results for GARCH(1,1) models
Shanghai Index
A. GARCH(l,l) full sample estimation results, December 28 1990 to April 18 2011
0.746 (0.236)
0.162 (0.034)
0.805 (0.037)

ˆ
ˆ / 1− 
ˆ −


22.638 (7.497)

B. GARCH(1,l) estimation results for the sub-samples defined by the structural breaks
Subsample 1

̂
̂
̂

ˆ
ˆ / 1− 
ˆ −


Subsample 2

̂
̂
̂
ˆ
ˆ / 1− 
ˆ −


Subsample 3

̂
̂
̂
ˆ
ˆ / 1− 
ˆ −


Subsample 4

̂
̂
̂
ˆ
ˆ / 1− 
ˆ −


December 28 1990October 20 1996
2.205 (0.888)
0.196 (0.054)
0.764 (0.053)
54.809 (35.065)
October 21 1996December 08 2006
9.045 (0.733)
0.000 (0.000)
0.000 (0.000)
9.045 (0.733)
December 09 2006March 20 2009
30.313 (4.062)
0.000 (0.000)
0.000 (0.000)
30.313 (4.062)
March 21 2009April 1 2011
9.597(1.080)
0.000 (0.000)
0.000 (0.000)
9.597 (1.080)

Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses.
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Table 3. Summary Statistics – Shenzhen Stock Index Returns.
Shenzhen Index
Mean
Standard deviation
Skewness
Excess kurtosis
Minimum
Maximum
ARCH Lagrange multiplier (q = 2)

0.142 (0.147)
4.771 (0.161)
0.216 (0.213)
2.761 (0.612)
-25.155
22.265
45.99 [0.000]

ARCH Lagrange multiplier (q = 10)

151.48 [0.000]

Note: Returns are defined as 100 times the log-difference of weekly index level. Heteroskedastic and
autocorrelation consistent standard errors for the mean, standard deviation, skewness, and excess kurtosis are given
in parentheses. ARCH Lagrange multiplier statistics correspond to a test of the null hypothesis of no ARCH effects
from lag orders 1 through q. P-values are given in brackets; 0.000 indicates less than 0.0005.
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̂
̂
̂

Table 4. Quasi maximum likelihood estimation results for GARCH(1,1) models
Shenzhen Stock Index
A. GARCH(l,l) full sample estimation results, April 18 1991 to April 1 2011
0.977 (0.387)
0.150 (0.034)
0.818 (0.041)

ˆ
ˆ / 1− 
ˆ −


30.964 (10.752)

B. GARCH(1,l) estimation results for the sub-samples defined by the structural breaks

̂

April 18 1991May 16 1997
38.313 (4.185)
0.000 (0.000)
0.000 (0.000)

ˆ
ˆ / 1− 
ˆ −


38.313 (4.185)

Subsample 1

̂
̂

Subsample 2

̂
̂
̂
ˆ
ˆ / 1− 
ˆ −


Subsample 3

̂
̂
̂
ˆ
ˆ / 1− 
ˆ −


Subsample 4

̂
̂
̂
ˆ
ˆ / 1− 
ˆ −


May 17 1997November 10 2006
2.578 (0.740)
0.204 (0.056)
0.560 (0.091)
10.939 (1.479)
November 11 2006March 20 2009
40.176 (5.391)
0.000 (0.000)
0.000 (0.000)
40.176 (5.391)
March 21 2009April 1 2011
12.743(1.544)
0.000 (0.000)
0.000 (0.000)
12.743 (1.544)

Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses.
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Table 5: Event Description at Each Structure Break Point
Shanghai

Time Period
Dec. 28, 1990 Dec. 20, 1996
Dec. 21, 1996 Dec. 08, 2006
Dec. 09, 2006 Mar. 20, 2009
Mar. 21, 2009 April. 1, 2011

Duration Possibly Related Events or
Policy Changes
310
Publication of the 1996
weeks
Regulations
498
Most SOEs reached agreement
weeks
on the compensation
115
Economic slump/Expansion of
weeks
capitalization
107
weeks

SD
0.0630

Mean
Weekly
-0.0013

0.0314

0.0029

0.0517

-0.0029

0.0304

-0.0011

Shenzhen

Time Period

Duration

Apr. 18, 1991 May. 16, 1997
May. 17, 1997 Nov. 10, 2006
Nov. 11, 2006 Mar. 20, 2009
Mar. 21, 2009 April. 1, 2011

314
weeks
474
weeks
119
weeks
107
weeks

Possibly Related Events or
Policy Changes
Publication of the 1996
Regulations
Most SOEs reached agreement
on the compensation
Economic slump/Expansion of
capitalization

SD

Mean
Weekly

0.0626

-0.0006

0.0310

0.0022

0.0511

-0.0026

0.0304

-0.0011
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Figure 1: The Structure Break and the Level of Volatility for SSE and SZSE.
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